In dubio pro societate nas decisões de pronúncia no rito do tribunal do júri: violação da presunção de inocência

Abstract

With the enactment of the Federal Constitution on October 5, 1988, fundamental principles began to occupy a prominent and primacy position in the Brazilian legal system. Criminal Law, by its nature, establishes an intrinsic relationship with the Constitution, which is configured as the foundation of the entire regulatory framework, guiding both the drafting of legislation and the interpretation of criminal provisions, ensuring that these norms comply with constitutional values and guarantees. Although the principle of constitutional supremacy is recognized, the Brazilian legal system often disregards principle-based precepts, especially when the majority case law contradicts the principle of in dubio pro reo. This occurs in the first phase of the jury trial, where, in the indictment decisions, the principle of in dubio pro societate is applied, allowing the judge, in the face of doubt about authorship, to favor society by indicting the defendant, to the detriment of constitutional guarantees. In view of the detailed analysis, it is concluded that the maxim in dubio pro societate lacks constitutional basis and is clearly in opposition to the principle of the presumption of innocence. Its application in decisions of indictment violates fundamental rights, compromising the integrity of the Rule of Law, which is based on individual protection and due process. Therefore, any decision that subverts the presumption of innocence must be rigorously contested.