A acrasia em aristóteles: conflito de desejos, o desenvolvimento do caráter e sua epistemologia

Abstract

This work aims to present the main elements found in Aristotle’s conception of the phenomenon of akrasia, characteristic of the akratic character. The philosopher understands it as a type of action in which the agent has conflicting motivations: on one hand, his appetites (epithymiai) impel him to act in such a way as to satiate them, while his wish (boulēsis), a distinctively rational desire, and therefore exclusively human, exhorts him to act in a way comprehended by himself as right. This conflict also characterizes the akratic agent’s counterpart, the enkratic agent (enkratēs). They differ in the fact that, while the enkratic abides by his rational exhortation, the akratic surrenders to his appetites. This work aims to analyze the most relevant texts from the Nicomachean Ethics on the subject, considering the main elements of Aristotelian moral psychology to show how it is possible for the akratic agent to act contrary to what he himself understands as correct, highlighting the physiological aspects and, in the last chapter, the epistemological aspects of the phenomenon.