Uma possível solução aos paradoxos da ética populacional: avaliando a tentativa de explicar como a conclusão repugnante pode ser verdadeira embora pareça obviamente falsa

Abstract

To solve the problems of Population Ethics, such as the problem of climate change, we need to know which axiological theory is true, to the extent that we need to know which decision is the best decision to make. However, the literature on population axiology shows us that any axiological theory implies some highly counterintuitive conclusion, which seems obviously false (such as the Repugnant Conclusion, for example). Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that we are not justified to believe any of these theories. It follows that we cannot be sure about which decision is the best decision to make. Therefore, we find ourselves in a situation of axiological uncertainty. I investigate in this dissertation a way to react to this situation of axiological uncertainty, which consists in explaining how the Repugnant Conclusion can be true, although it seems obviously false. More specifically, I investigate two types of explanation, the explanation of quality and the explanation of quantity. At first, I argue with Cowie (2019) that the explanation of quality is not plausible, in that it cannot deal well with the objections of the Very Repugnant Conclusion and the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion. Then I investigate whether the explanation of quantity, despite escaping these objections, is a plausible explanation. Against the versions of this explanation of quantity advanced by Broome (2004) and Huemer (2008), I reproduce the objections advanced by Mogensen (2022) to them, especially the upper limit objection. I contribute to this discussion by putting forward a reply to this objection of the upper limit and a possible rejoinder to that reply. Subsequently, I evaluate two other objections to this explanation of quantity, advanced by Temkin (2012) and Pummer (2013), and reproduce the replica advanced by Figueredo (2022) against these objections. I also contribute to the literature by advancing a new objection to this explanation of quantity, which consists in accusing it of not explaining how the Repugnant Conclusion can be true although it seems obviously false, in that it does not make the Repugnant Conclusion less counterintuitive. Finally, I conclude the dissertation systematizing the greatest difficulties to be overcome by the defender of the explanation of quantity in order that this explanation justifies us to believe that the Repugnant Conclusion is true instead of false.