A noção Aristotélica de definição e seu papel no argumento elêntico

Abstract

In Metaphysics IV.4, Aristotle sets out to “demonstrate by refutation” the Principle of Non- Contradiction (PNC). This argument, which is known as the elenctic argument, starts by demanding that an interlocutor who denies the PNC utters a meaningful name. Then, Aristotle reasons that this name must mean that it “is (or is not) this and that” and that this will be “something definite.” Consequently, the argument’s interlocutor could not, at the same time, affirm the negation of what has been defined. The central questions of this dissertation are: how should this argumentative step be interpreted and how does it relate to Aristotle’s notion of definition? On one hand, it can be read as involving a real definition, which is a statement of the essence of an existent being. On the other, it is interpreted as demanding a nominal definition, which is merely the explication of the meaning of a term. After exploring some of the different proposed interpretations, we will defend the latter alternative. In our first chapter, we will present the problem in question and some of the different ways in which it has been dealt with in the secondary literature. Following that, we’ll argue that a semantic interpretation of the argument, according to which its force lies only in aspects of the act of uttering a meaningful name, requires Aristotle to have a notion of nominal definition which he considers legitimate. In our second chapter, we’ll argue that this is the case by proposing what we’ll call an ampliative interpretation of Aristotelian definition. According to this interpretation, real and nominal definition occupy different regions of a continuum of definitional success, and are both considered, by Aristotle, to be legitimate and adequate for use in different epistemic contexts. In that chapter, we’ll examine the relevant textual evidence and deal with problems faced by this interpretation. Lastly, we’ll consider the consequences this ampliative interpretation of definition has for the semantic interpretation of the elenctic argument.