Whistleblowing na contabilidade: uma análise dos fatores de incentivo e barreira sob a perspectiva do q-method

Abstract

The anti-corruption agenda embedded in integrity and governance systems, and associated with SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), depends on institutional mechanisms capable of detecting and correcting wrongdoing in a timely manner. In this context, whistleblowing is frequently presented as a key mechanism, yet its effectiveness is shaped by factors that go beyond the formal existence of a reporting channel: institutional credibility, protection for reporters, confidence in investigations, and the quality of organizational responses. In Brazil, this debate also intersects with the AML/CFT regulatory framework aligned with FATF standards, under which accounting professionals and accounting firms may have duties to communicate certain suspicious operations to COAF, adding a legal-regulatory layer to the voice–silence dilemma. While the literature recognizes multiple barriers and incentives, there is still limited understanding of how these elements are organized as subjective configurations that structure the decision to report wrongdoing, particularly among accounting professionals, whose practice is permeated by professional normativity, reputational risk, and potential career consequences. Addressing this gap, this study identifies typologies of viewpoints on whistleblowing among accounting professionals and examines how the perceived social value of the profession relates to these viewpoints, articulating the process of problem perception, decision-making, channel choice, and expectations of response. To capture patterns of shared subjectivity, the study adopts Q-Method, which enables the mapping of typical decision logics from comparative rankings of statements. A set of 40 statements, organized into theoretical dimensions, was administered through an online Q-sort task and complemented by post-sort interviews with participants selected for their defining power within the extracted viewpoints. The study involved 31 accounting professionals with active registration with the Brazilian Regional Accounting Council (CRC), all located in Southeast Brazil; 18 had more than ten years of experience in accounting and 13 had between five and ten years. Regarding highest educational attainment, the group included four PhDs and four MScs in Accounting, three MScs in other fields (Education and Engineering), six MBA-level specialists, twelve BSc holders in accounting, and two technical-level accounting professionals. The findings reveal two interpretable typologies. The first (F1) expresses a viability/self-protection decision logic marked by institutional skepticism: the reporting channel is perceived as a potential source of exposure, impunity is considered plausible, and retaliation risks, reputational costs, and career impacts become central. From this viewpoint, reporting becomes conditional, requiring effective anonymity, operational protection, and governance of case handling, including feedback and a minimum expectation of consequences. The second (F2) expresses a moral–professional duty decision logic oriented toward the public interest: willingness to report is triggered by evidence deemed reliable and by an assessment of meaningful harm to third parties, combining situational prudence with comparatively greater confidence in investigative capacity and enforcement. The post-sort interviews reinforce and semantically refine the distinction between “the channel as exposure” (F1) and “duty with criteria” (F2), clarifying the judgment mechanisms that underpin each viewpoint. The study concludes that the profession’s social value operates in two complementary registers: as a public mission that can motivate voice, and as reputational and career vulnerability that favors silence when institutional credibility is low. Implications include the design of reporting channels with protection and feedback, effective anti-retaliation policies, and ethical education with procedural and institutional emphasis.