O papel moderador do conselho de administração na relação entre estrutura de propriedade e risco de fraude

Abstract

This study aimed to investigate the moderating role of the board of directors in the relationship between ownership structure and fraud risk. The sample consisted of companies listed on the B3 stock exchange, from 2018 to 2024. Based on Agency Theory, the research used the quantitative M-Score Beneish model to detect fraudulent trends in financial reports. The proxy for ownership structure was shareholder concentration. The relationship between shareholder concentration and fraud risk, and the moderation of the size and independence of the board of directors in this relationship, were tested. The findings do not support the existence of a significant relationship between shareholder concentration and fraud risk, which may be explained by the fact that the relationships between these variables are more complex, requiring further studies. Considering that the literature indicates that the relationship between shareholder concentration and fraud risk is effective in contexts where majority shareholders participate in the board of directors, the moderation of the board of directors in this relationship was tested. The test results indicated that the board of directors, both in its size and independence, did not prove to be statistically significant as a moderator in the relationship between ownership structure and fraud risk. Contrary to expectations established based on the literature, the empirical results did not support the moderating role in the relationship between ownership structure and fraud risk, indicating that, in the analyzed context, the inclusion of the moderating variable did not alter the pattern of non-significance of the investigated relationship. The research contributes to the understanding of governance dynamics in the Brazilian market, filling a gap in the literature by analyzing these interactions.