Orçamento e conflitos de interesse: um ensaio baseado na teoria da agência

Abstract

This theoretical essay aims to reflect on possible conflicts of interest that impact the budgetary process, in light of Agency Theory, encompassing the dynamics of relationships between principals and agents involved in this process. The essay highlights how information asymmetry and misaligned objectives can impact the budgetary process, as well as the relationship between shareholders and directors. It also highlights how information asymmetry and misaligned objectives can distort the budgetary process. Through a critical analysis of potential conflicts that may exist in the context of issues related to the budgetary process, we initially sought to delve deeper into the discussion of the sources of conflict in this context. We emphasize the relevance of Corporate Governance and management ethics in mitigating such conflicts. This essay contributes to the field by highlighting the complexity of relationships of interest and their impacts on budgetary practices, and by proposing avenues for future empirical research. Agency Theory offers a robust framework for understanding and addressing the challenges inherent to budget management in organizations, and also has the potential to explain existing conflicts.