A entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul: uma análise da atuação do Congresso Nacional pela ótica da Teoria dos Jogos em dois Níveis

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the Protocol of Entry of Venezuela into Mercosur from a dual perspective (domestic and external), using Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory as a basis. It is assumed that this vote reflects on the role of the National Congress in formulating policies abroad. Occasionally, it seeks to discuss the limits of this participation, which is conditioned by the Executive Power. Thus, we seek to describe the history of Foreign Policy Analysis, the emergence of concern with domestic participation in foreign relations, understand the context of the formulation of Two-level Game Theory, involve the history of the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy from from the promulgation of the 1988 constitution and the coalition presidentialism to, then, understand the existing connection with the legislature and how this happened in the vote.