A construção da paz à luz dos processos de reforma do setor de segurança e de desarmamento, desmobilização e reintegração: uma análise da intervenção no afeganistão entre 2001 e 2014

Abstract

What variables help us understand the difficulties of peacebuilding in Afghanistan, particularly from the beginning of the US intervention through the onset of the troop withdrawal process (2001-2014)? Since the end of the Cold War, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) have been present in the peace agenda, indicating the relation between governance, security and development. Through the process-tracing methodology, this study looks into the hypothesis that the challenges to the peace intervention in Afghanistan were related to the failure of those two processes. Among the reasons to this failure are: the international approach - sometimes negligent, sometimes militarized - that failed in assessing the needs of Afghan society; the presence of warlords in the government, who hindered the international initiatives; the delay to create specific and concise programs, fostering a security vacuum in the interior of the country, where militias and the Taliban itself defied the cultivated efforts and the authority of the central government; and the fiscal and administrative incapacity, which threatened the sustainability of peace and development in the country. Therefore, this study contributes to the debate on the Afghan peace process still in effect, offering a perspective on the essential practices for its success.