No limite do risco: impactos da regulação sobre a atuação das Credit Rating Agencies

Abstract

The rupture of the institutionality established at Bretton Woods meant the progressive liberalization of international capital flows and a step forward towards financial globalization. Led by the United States (USA), such process has increased the exposure of risk actors by stimulating speculation and the development of new financial products. Given the uncertainty and increasing volatility of international capital, reducing risk has become one of the main goals of public and private actors. To meet this need, Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) emerged as the main alternative in the evaluation of financial products and reduction of information asymmetry in the International Financial System (SFI). These agencies "resurged" and expanded significantly since the 1970s, largely due to the progressive incorporation of their ratings for regulatory purposes, mainly by the United States. However, during the 1990s and early 2000s, successive financial crises tested the efficiency and functionality of CRAs, generating a series of criticisms and questions to the agencies. However, it was with the Crisis of 2007/2008 that the "regulatory wave" increased. Accused of taking direct part in the crisis, the agencies received a heavy blow over their influence and position in the SFI, seeing their revenues fall after a spiraling growth. Among the objectives of the regulation, it was evident the withdrawal of the classifications of the North American regulations, unlike what had been occurring. Assuming its importance for financial markets, the US Congress aimed to reduce reliance on credit ratings and stimulate competition in the rating industry. Contrary to expectations, the "Big Three" resumed their growth reaching pre-crisis levels in 2008. In an attempt to understand the reason for the recovery of growth in revenues and performance, and indeed whether such "regulation" would limit the power of such agencies, I analyze the US government's attempts to establish stricter legislation for CRAs . To that end, I examine the reports, hearings, and legislation that emerged in the period from 2000 to 2016, and to what extent such regulatory changes have actually advanced in limiting agency performance. My hypothesis in this paper is that, rather than limiting the power of major CRAs, such regulation would increasingly place them within the system, making them an important force in SFI. To try to corroborate my hypothesis, I use Jamie Peck's interpretation of neoliberalism as a program that seeks to introduce new forms of regulation, or even (re) regulation, by introducing new governance regimes. Finally, I argue that the CRAs, taking advantage of their insertion in international regulations, especially in the USA, have become increasingly important in the continuous regulation of the financial system and in the dissemination of neoliberal measures. Thus, the attempt to regulate the rating industry was not effective in limiting the agencies' performance, but reorganized them in order to maintain their position as important gears of the financial system, reinforcing their importance for the financial system and the reconstruction of neoliberal governance