Fatores determinantes do gerenciamento de resultados em estatais brasileiras

Abstract

The accounting information can be manipulated to hamper minority shareholders’ perception about the expropriation of their resources. Considering (i) that State-Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs) minority shareholders can have their wealth expropriated as a result of the opportunistic behavior of politicians and bureaucrats (SHLEIFER, 1998; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1994), (ii) that Brazil has seen a high number of corruption scandals involving SOEs, and (iii) that one of the duties of the board of directors is to reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, this research carried out the following goals: (a) to analyze the earnings management in Brazilian SOEs; (b) to analyze the relation between practices of earnings management and ownership structure; (c) to analyze characteristics of some SOEs’ boards of directors; and (d) to analyze how these characteristics are related with earnings management. These analyses were made through non-parametric tests and regression models with panel data. To achieve goals (a) and (b), this research covered the period from 2006 to 2015, with a sample of 250 non-financial companies listed by BM&FBovespa, out of which 26 were state-controlled enterprises. The metrics for earnings management were discretionary accruals estimated using Kang and Sivaramakrishnan’s (1995) model. The results of non-parametric tests showed that the ownership structure is more concentrated in SOEs, and that control rights significantly overweight cash flow rights. SOEs tend to practice income increasing, and this result has persisted even after the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Regarding the goals (c) and (d), the characteristics of the boards of directors analyzed were the existence of an audit committee; the CEO’s participation in the board of directors; the accumulation of positions by the same person, such as CEO and board chairman; independence; size; and annual frequency of meetings. These characteristics were collected from the Reference Form (FR) available at the Brazilian Security Exchange Commission (CVM) website, covering the period from 2010 to 2015. The sample consisted of 201 companies, out of which 25 were state-controlled companies. Results from non-parametric tests showed less independence of SOEs’ boards of directors, as well as higher size and annual frequency of meetings. The presence of the CEO in the board of directors was more frequent in state-controlled companies. However, SOEs’ CEOs do not usually occupy the chairman position in the board. Few observations indicated the existence of audit committees. The results showed the need of Brazilian boards of directors to become more independent, mainly those of SOEs, since this independency reduces earnings management.