Do materialismo interdisciplinar à crítica à razão instrumental: um estudo sobre o desenvolvimento da filosofia de Max Horkheimer

Abstract

The primary objective of this study is to analyze the development of Max Horkheimer’s Critical Theory by means of a clarification of the elements that led his thought to a preference for the critique of instrumental reason over the materialistic interdisciplinary project adopted in his early writings. The achievement of this goal takes place initially with the presentation of the social philosophy model undertaken by Horkheimer in the writings of the 1930s, featuring what is termed interdisciplinary materialism. This presentation, uses the reasoning of the correct theory intended by Horkheimer through the critical assimilation of elements from the German idealistic tradition of the Kant and Hegel, Marx's historical materialism, represented by Lukács humanist Marxism, and post-Hegelian currents of thought, specifically the Lebensphilosophie of Nietzsche, Bergson and Dilthey, besides the Vienna Circle logical empiricism. In addition, the research seeks to elucidate the critic made by Horkheimer concerning the deterioration of Western rationality, which was in turn based on a historical ransom of the relationship between the objective and subjective aspects of reason, pointing out the prevalence of the latter as responsible for the decline of both the notion of individual and the rationality itself. Characterizing the different phases of Horkheimer’s thought, this research highlights the historical, economic and theoric factors that influenced the direction taken by his philosophy and that of the Frankfurt School. To this end, it analyzes the shift of the Institute for Social Research from Frankfurt to the United States, fleeing from the advance of German National Socialism, and the theoretical narrowing of Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, in addition to presenting different positions of scholars about the development of Horkheimer’s philosophy. The research points out, finally, to the argument that, as opposed to the traditional idea of complete rupture, there is effectively a circumstantial discontinuity in the 1940s writings, which does not necessarily mean an abandonment of Horkheimer’s interest in interdisciplinary materialism.