O problema do ser a partir dos referenciais fenomenológicos: da Fenomenologia transcendental à ontologia fenomenológica

Abstract

The theme that has motivated this research was the possibility of articulation between phenomenology and ontology. It had the intention to show, about this, that the resumption of the problem of being was already the central possibility inscribed in Husserl’s philosophical project. It’s enough to remember, indeed, that the tendency of thinking that comes with Husserl and goes on through Heidegger, Sartre and others, seems rightly to want to corroborate that assumption. Husserl inaugurated phenomenology assigning it already explicitly to the task of forming an universal ontology of phenomena. The introduction and epilogue of the Cartesian Meditations and, in particular, the paragraph 59 of this book, also point to the same idea. So, we put ourselves, firstly, at the investigation of that hypothesis guided by Husserl’s reading and some of his interpreters. However, another question has soon imposed to us, throughout the research process, requiring our attention: Husserl seems to propose a phenomenological reference framework that anticipates the settingup of ontology and offers itself as an indispensable item for that. This framework consists of four keyreferences – which seem to assume the role of conditions and guidelines for all ontology that wants to establish itself from the phenomenology. They are: 1 the intentional correlation; 2 the thesis of the immanence and transcendence; 3 the phenomenological reduction; 4 the teleological structure. As we know, the historical path of phenomenology, after Husserl, carries on through Heidegger and Sartre. The dean hypothesis of our work, therefore, will be that the four benchmarks provide guidance for them in their attempt to convert the transcendental phenomenology in a phenomenological ontology. We propose here to check closely the outcome of this project, seeing the reception of the references by Heidegger and Sartre, and how their phenomenological ontology behaves in relation to the guidelines above elaborated by Husserl. We will see that all takes place, in fact, as if every ontology whose orientation is phenomenological starts from the references of correlation, immanence, transcendence, reduction, teleology, goes back to them and there remains be extending them or be changing their meaning. However, we wish here does not establish a schematism, whose surplus formalism would ultimately moving away from the reality. The idea is just to propose a way of interpretation in order to better understand how the transcendental phenomenology is converted by Heidegger and Sartre in a phenomenological ontology, but without losing sight of the reference framework firstly left by Husserl.