Limitação dos mandatos de Ministros das Supremas Cortes Constitucionais como um dos instrumentos centrais de manutenção do Regime Democrático de Direito

Abstract

This article's main objective is to analyze the term limits of Supreme Court justices, focusing on the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), contributing to both Constitutional Law and the maintenance of the Democratic Rule of Law. The research finds that, in Brazil, there is a lack of mechanisms that reconcile judicial independence with the alternation of thought and adaptation to social changes. The bibliographic and documentary research examines the composition and functioning of the Constitutional Courts and compares distinct institutional models: the German model, which adopts fixed twelve-year terms without reappointment, and the USA model, which maintains lifetime tenure. These models have opposing models regarding term lengths, allowing us to examine the advantages and disadvantages of each system and assess their suitability for the Brazilian context. The research concludes that fixed terms, without reappointment and with a quarantine period, can reduce the risk of politicization, oxygenate jurisprudence, and strengthen the legitimacy of the Judiciary, offering relevant support for institutional reforms in the area of ​​Constitutional Law.