Efeito da confiança no ceticismo e na detecção de corrupção de auditores de tribunais de contas

Abstract

This thesis investigates the role of relational trust in government auditing, focusing on the performance of auditors in the detection of corruption in the Courts of Auditors. The overall objective is to analyze how relational trust between auditor and auditee affects the performance of external auditors in the oversight of local governments, their skepticism and their propensity to identify irregularities. Structured in three independent but interconnected articles, the research answers the following question: what is the relationship between trust and the performance of auditors in the Courts of Auditors in detecting corruption? Developed in the format of articles, the thesis adopts a multiparadigm approach, integrating different methods: systematic review, experiment, and qualitative research, seeking complementarity. The originality of the thesis lies in its analysis of trust at the microlevel, exploring interpersonal interactions in government audits, a topic rarely addressed in the academic literature. The theoretical and practical relevance is evident in the critique of the hegemonic model of New Public Management, based on distrust and ineffective anti-corruption policies, proposing a relational approach to external oversight. The first article, a systematic literature review, found that trust has been widely associated with effective governance, transparency, and cooperation, factors that reduce the perception of corruption. However, a significant gap was identified in the analysis of direct interactions between public officials, especially in local contexts. The second article, experimental in nature, demonstrated that trust, when based on a history of positive interactions, reduces auditors' professional skepticism. A negative history, in turn, intensifies this skepticism. Auditors' accounting background proved to be an important moderator: auditors with accounting backgrounds showed greater skepticism, especially when faced with accounting information. These results suggest that trust shapes investigative behavior, but its combination with technical competence is essential to balance rigor and cooperation, and provides evidence that relational trust impacts auditors' performance, an aspect not addressed in previous literature. The third article, qualitative, shows that interpersonal trust influences daily practices in Audit Courts. Despite the establishment of formal communication channels by Audit Courts, auditors and auditees often resort to informal, more agile, trust-based means of communication, providing further evidence of the effects of relational trust on auditors' performance. The predominance of remote audits, while efficient, weakens interpersonal bonds and limits access to privileged information, which is often only shared in contexts of mutual trust. The research also showed that trust does not compromise auditors' independence, but rather facilitates access to relevant data and the cooperation of auditees. Taken together, the articles demonstrate that relational trust between auditors and auditees impacts auditors' performance, and this aspect should be considered when structuring audit activities, questioning the principles of skepticism and independence. The thesis' contributions are multiple. Theoretically, it broadens the understanding of the role of trust in government auditing and in detecting corruption, an aspect not explored in previous literature. In practical terms, it offers insights into rethinking external oversight strategies, highlighting the importance of collaborative relationships and institutional environments that value trust as an effective oversight tool for detecting corruption. The thesis concludes that interpersonal trust is a relevant relational component for improving auditors' performance and strengthening the capacity of Audit Courts to prevent and combat corruption.