Operações de Paz nos Anos 90: uma análise da Missão de Assistência das Nações Unidas para Ruanda sob a perspectiva do Force Commander Roméo Dallaire

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from the perspective of Force Commander Roméo Dallaire, in order to critically examine the notion of failure commonly attributed to the mission. The research seeks to answer the following question: could the implementation of a more robust mandate for UNAMIR—shifting from peacekeeping to peace enforcement—have made the mission more effective in preventing or mitigating the 1994 Rwandan genocide? The specific objectives are to evaluate the mission’s design, investigate the factors that hindered a mandate change, and understand the structural and political limitations of the UN in that context. The methodology adopted is the hypothetical-deductive method, using process tracing to reconstruct the causal chain of events, decisions, and institutional omissions that shaped the mission’s outcomes. The theoretical framework is grounded in both classical and contemporary peace operations scholars, such as Paul Diehl, Peter Wallensteen, and Juliana Bigatão. The main empirical sources include the book Shake Hands with the Devil by Roméo Dallaire and the article “The True Measures of Success,” which support the analysis of the commander’s actions in contrast to the inertia of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The research suggests that Dallaire’s leadership demonstrated viable alternatives to the UN’s hesitant stance, indicating that UNAMIR’s ineffectiveness was not inevitable.