O Conflito Fronteiriço entre Guiana e Venezuela: uma investigação do poder dissuasório brasileiro no continente sul-americano

Abstract

International security is one of the central themes in International Relations, with deterrence being an inherent tool in state behavior amid conflicts. In the South American context — traditionally marked by stability and diplomatic solutions — the recent escalation of the territorial dispute between Guyana and Venezuela over the Essequibo region raises questions about Brazil’s ability to influence conflict resolution. Historically, Brazil has played a mediating role, prioritizing diplomacy and support for International Law. However, the dispute, especially after Venezuela’s official annexation of the territory, highlights the challenges of Brazilian diplomacy and the limitations of its strategic influence in the region. This article adopts a qualitative approach based on the neorealist school, as well as the Rational Deterrence Theory and the Latin American Hybrid Security Thesis. It draws on a geopolitical analysis to investigate whether Brazil plays a deterrent role in the crisis and seeks to understand the implications of this scenario for the balance of power in South America. Accordingly, the article examines the dynamics of regional security, the history of the dispute, the motivations for conflict, and the impact of other international actors. The final analysis suggests a relative decline in Brazil’s regional influence, a limited deterrence capacity, and negative effects on regional peace in South America.