A efetividade do regime das nações unidas para o espaço exterior diante da armamentização do espaço

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to examine the level of effectiveness of the UN Regime for Outer Space in the face of space weaponization. In other words, to investigate if the regime can sufficiently affect the behavior of members to prevent the placement of weapons in Earth’s orbit. To answer this question, the paper presents two analyzes, one of regime design, and the other of US space policy. Considering the UN Regime for Outer Space a regulatory regime that deals with a collaboration problem, the following design elements were considered: interpretation, implementation, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement. Furthermore, as the US is one of the most relevant members of the regime, the space policies of the Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden administrations were studied, addressing issues such as strategic vision, military programs, military doctrine, and international engagement. By combining these two analyses, it was possible to conclude that the regime is not effective enough to prevent the weaponization of space. This is because regime design is not well developed, so it cannot produce the desired effects on the behavior of members. In fact, one of the main factors causing this problem is US resistance to the constitution of a regime that is not in accordance with its national security interests.