Governança tributária: estudo sobre os seus reflexos na evasão fiscal

Abstract

The aim of this work was to verify the reflexes of the tax governance in the tax evasion of the countries. The motivation for analyzing this interaction lies in the fact that there is still no evidence on the reflexes of tax governance, as a kind of corporate governance, in reducing tax evasion. Despite this empirical gap, tax governance has been implemented by companies through the influence or determination of the tax authorities of countries or international organizations as an additional instrument to mitigate evasion, contributing to the improvement of the balance of public accounts, and consequently impacting throughout society. The theoretical support used by the study is Agency Theory, assuming that evasion is a phenomenon resulting from the conflict between taxpayer and government, the so-called tax agency. In this context, tax governance is a potential element of mitigation of this conflict, but its relationship has not yet been proven in the empirical models already performed in the literature. Therefore, the present study used a quantitative methodology, using a panel data model, with information collected from 2005 to 2015 and for a sample of 90 countries. In addition to the descriptive statistics, a total of three analysis models were estimated with respective assumption consistency, endogeneity and validity tests, in order to find the most robust and significant model for the research. The results show statistical significance and confirm the expected theoretical hypothesis that the countries of the sample that have tax governance had lower levels of tax evasion. They were used as control variables, according to the taxation literature, the tax burden, tax complexity, the perception of corruption, the enforcement of countries and the size of state spending. As additional results, enforcement was statistically significant and revealed a strong correlation between perception of corruption, presenting the behavior expected in the literature, which confirms the notes of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and suggests that there is a complementary relationship with tax governance. Thus, the study not only achieves its central objective, but also releases results that deserve reflection on the studies already done on tax evasion, broadening the theoretical perspective on the subject in a broad set of countries. Tax evasion limits the ability of a government to increase revenues in order to meet budget requirements, thus, the results obtained contribute to the insertion of another factor associated with the evasion phenomenon, expanding knowledge about the subject, which enables business action. and state aid on how to address this problem and minimize its occurrence.