Análise da influência do lobbying no processo de alteração da IAS 41 Bearer Plant

Abstract

Regulation comes in response to demands from interest groups (Stigler, 1971). The studies of Sutton (1984) point out that the most effective moment of lobbying in the accounting regulation process occurs before the issuance of the Exposure Draft, in the issue of the Discussion Paper (DP) or, in the normative projects. The present study analyzes the influence of lobbying on the IAS 41 Bearer Plant change process. This was chosen because the change in IAS 41 was based on a study by a group of interest (AOSSG / MASB). Which preceded the due process and culminated in the exclusion of the Discussion Paper stage? As a contribution, this study provides evidence of the influence of interest groups and their strategies used in the process of accounting standards regulation IAS 41. The study population is composed of the seventy-four comment letters submitted by Exposure Draft 2013/8 respondents. In addition to the sample plan, we have the financial statements of companies related in AOSSG/MASB letter to analyze the impact of the change of the standard in the economic-financial indicators. The methodology addresses the description and quantitative analysis of the comments letters and economic-financial indicators of the business proxy. Description the position of the respondents who presented success and insuccess to the scope proposed by the IASB to restrict only to the carrier plants the alteration of IAS 41 is analyzed. Quantitatively, logistic regression is applied to investigate the incidence of lobbying in the Exposure Draft stage considering as variables the responses of the comment letters, which are also analyzed using the statistical distribution for each answer of the focus questions of that study. In addition, the impact of the amendment of IAS 41 on the economic-financial indicators of companies related in AOSSG/MASB letter in this work is assessed. The results indicate that the comment letters on the regulatory process ED 2013/8 have no influence on the decision of the regulators. It is concluded that the lobbying action happened through the study presented by the interest group representing the oil palm and rubber industry, noting the Sutton theory, since the action of the lobbyists had greater effectiveness in the stage that preceded the process normative amendment of IAS 41 in line with Sutton’s (1984) theory.