Hermenêutica Filosófica Gadameriana: sob as críticas do subjetivismo e da validade do sentido verbal

Abstract

Since Descartes, the search for a rational, unquestionable, and stable method has been regarded as an iter for the safe knowledge. The struggle against scholasticism and traditional philosophy, moved by Descartes’ methodologizing discourse within its search for the truth by means of a rational procedure, has carried out an over scientificized method, and has rationalized philosophy. The old subject-object dichotomy has reinvigorated itself as natural science, now including the apprehension of object by subject in a safe and mathematical way, testing all scientific and philosophic validities through the Cartesian method of doubt. Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) challenges such discourse of modernity – which believes in the safety of method – by criticizing scientific iluminism and reevaluating the importance of tradition – that was indeed shadowed by rational ideals of iluminism. Gadamer recreates the previous concept – or pre-concept –, thus, the idea of “preconception” (prejudice) – so repressed within the discourse of modernity – attains vital importance through Gadamer’s reinvigorating thought for the fabrication of his philosophical model of hermeneutics. Comprehension is hermeneutic in all instances. According to Gadamer, hermeneutics is more than simple text interpretation. In fact, it achieves scopes of interpretation of general comprehension, as well as the own human existence one, which is characterized in terms of a “hermeneutic circle”. Gadamer carried on Heidegger’s hermeneutics thought, which has demonstrated that interpretation of the world is not possible without a pre-comprehension (against Descartes). However, the key of the present work, besides holding the purpose to recreate the pathway of hermeneutics under the reinvigorating lights of Gadamer in the sense of a philosophical hermeneutics that surpasses the simple textual interpretation, also seeks to demonstrate and evaluate the criticism of a subjectivism that punctuate Gadamer’s hermeneutics (BETTI, 1955), and one that is due to the validity of the verbal sense, which, according to Hirsch, would be absent of Gadamer’s proposition. This research intends to analyze Gadamer’s hermeneutics, tested under the criticism of Betti and Hirsch, therefore taking a stand for debate in order to evaluate the tough criticism of said authors considering also replication by Gadamer against his critics, eventually assessing the pretentious “subjectivity” of Gadamerian’s Hermeneutics.