Governança corporativa e valor de instituições financeiras brasileiras

Abstract

The separation between ownership and control in modern organizations generates conflicts, as the managers do not always act in accordance with the interests of the propertiers. In order to ensure that their interests be served through the maximization of their wealth, owners incur costs of monitoring and control of management. Therefore, corporate governance emerges as a set of internal and external mechanisms that aims to align the interests of managers and owners and assure the rights of other stakeholders, such as employees and creditors. It is believed that the alignment of interests affects the market value of companies. The relationship between governance practices and the value of companies has been target of studies throughout the world searching to contribute to the establishment of guidelines concerning the subject. This paper aimed to collaborate with the discussions on the issue, investigating the relation existing between better corporate governance structures, represented by the entry into the differentiated levels of corporate governance established by the Stock Exchange of São Paulo (BOVESPA), and the value of the Brazilian financial institutions. In this sense and taking into account that the three differentiated levels of governance established by BOVESPA present a growing scale of requirements, this study hypothesized that institutions listed at level 1 (level of lower requirement) presented lower market value than the financial companies at level 2, and these, in turn, presented lower market value than the participating institutions of the new market (level of highest requirement). The sample was composed of the financial companies that integrate the financial sector and insurance database Economática, and that have acceded until the year 2009 to the differentiated levels of governance of BOVESPA. From panel data with fixed effects for the period of 2007 to 2009, a method of ordinary least squares (OLS) robust to heteroscedasticity was used. As the governance variables of this study were the differentiated levels of governance of BOVESPA, they were characterized as dummy variables. In this case, the estimation model required that one of the variables be used as reference. Thus, the model of this research used the variable that represents the level 1 like reference, in terms of which checks the impact of the variables dummy level 2 and new market on the market value of financial companies in Brazil. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant and negative relation between the variable that represents the level 2 of governance and the market value of the analyzed institutions. On the other hand, the variable that represented the new market did not present statistically significant relationship with the variables of value. Thus, the theoretical assumption that the better the governance structure in Brazil, the greater the value of the company was not confirmed.