Um investigação sobre a percepção na filosofia de Descartes

Abstract

This paper presents a possible reading for texts in which Descartes deals with sensible perception. Descartes always seems to present perception according to a key distinction between perceptions and wills or between ideas and other types of thought. The aim here is to clarify what this distinction consists of and whether it is the same throughout Descartes' work. In addition, the paper aims to explore how this distinction is used by Descartes at important points in his philosophy, such as: his theory of judgment, the proof of the existence of material things, the explanation of the soul's interaction with the body and the definition of the soul's passion. The immediate object of investigation is the Third and Sixth Meditations, Part One of the Principles of Philosophy, Part One of the Passions of the Soul. Other texts such as the Second, Fourth and Fifth Meditations, the First and Fourth Replies and correspondence with Elisabeth are used to aid this interpretation.