A busca da origem da ideia de conexão necessária em Hume no Tratado e na Investigação: implicações para a proposta de ceticismo moderado

Abstract

This study investigates the extent to which the reformulation of the idea of necessary connection in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding remains consistent with Hume's proposal of mitigated scepticism presented in Section 1 of that work. To this end, it undertakes a comparative analysis of Hume's examination of the origin of the idea of necessary connection in A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, taking the copy principle as its theoretical foundation and employing the method of textual analysis. The comparison reveals significant methodological differences between the two works, particularly about the presentation of the problem and the reformulation of the explanation of the origin of the idea of necessary connection, bringing to light important interpretative issues. It concludes that these reformulations do not represent an abandonment of the philosophy developed in the Treatise but rather an adaptation of its exposition to the philosophical aims of the Enquiry, preserving the compatibility of the reformulation of the idea of necessary connection between cause and effect with the project of mitigated scepticism.