https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/5165 Fri, 17 Jul 2026 06:18:17 GMT 2026-07-17T06:18:17Z https://repositorio.ufu.br:443/retrieve/45471261-39ed-442d-803a-4e6e6868b9c7/COCFI.jpg https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/5165 https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48867 Title: Psicologia do orgiástico: perspectivas da liberdade no Crepúsculo dos ídolos Abstract: This dissertation is the result of research into the concept of freedom in Friedrich Nietzsche's work Twilight of the Idols (1888). It is known that the work of this controversial German philosopher has aroused interest in academic circles and exerted a notable influence on important contemporary thinkers. Here, we consider the fundamental role played by freedom in Nietzschean thought, as it permeates all of his philosophical creation, thanks to its articulation with other concepts. Therefore, we understand the importance of interpreting how the philosopher simultaneously criticizes the traditional notion of free will and elaborates his own concept of freedom. To accomplish this task, in addition to the aforementioned work, other readings were necessary as a basis for the research and the construction of this text. Among these, we highlight four fundamental books: Nietzsche and Freedom by Miguel Angel de Barrenechea; Nietzsche, Freedom and Immoralism by Alice Medrado; Nietzsche as Psychologist by Oswaldo Giacoia Junior; and Nietzsche and Philosophy by Gilles Deleuze. Our goal is to engage in dialogue with the diverse interpretations of Nietzsche's thought regarding the philosopher's treatment of the concept of freedom in his work. In the first part of this dissertation, we will analyze the aesthetic approach to freedom in Nietzschean thought. In the second part, we will examine the political perspective of freedom in Nietzsche. Finally, we will defend a possible reading of the concept of freedom in Nietzsche from a psychological perspective. This research was motivated by the perception that Nietzsche's thought has much to contribute to a deeper debate on freedom in contemporary times. Fri, 27 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48867 2026-02-27T00:00:00Z https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48818 Title: O segundo sujeito: o ser e o não ser na estrutura da psique humana segundo Carl Gustav Jung Abstract: This research aims to present the alleged existence of a second subject within the psyche as a philosophical problem of human reality, highlighting how contradictory an individual can be in their deliberations and life experiences. The second subject can be conceptually portrayed as an unconscious second personality that inhabits everyone and interferes with our conscious actions. However, the first subject—or simply the subject—is nothing less than the ego, the gravitational center of our consciousness that forms our identity. At least, this can be stated based on what we know about the conscious and unconscious through the empirical and theoretical arguments of the medical psychotherapist Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), who founded the Analytical Psychology upon which this text is based. Thus, this work understands that the discussion reverberates what constitutes the human soul, here referred to as personality, distinguishing it from the psyche (an uncommon distinction). All possible understanding regarding this is applied in the first chapter of this dissertation, titled “The Functions of the Subject in Personality”. Subsequently, the various layers of the human mind will be explored in depth in the second chapter, presenting “The Structure of the Psyche” and how a one-sidedness in human development, exclusively favoring rationality, has contributed to psychic problems or illnesses—which, in turn, are possibly the source of social and political issues, as will be better understood in the closing of the third chapter when discussing “Self-Knowledge”. That said, the methodology employed in this work is a hermeneutics of the featured author's bibliography, interpreting most of his concepts presented in works such as Psychological Types, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, and The Symbolic Life, Vol. 1. These are, therefore, the primary objects of study throughout the chapters, without excluding other supporting works, such as the interpretations of the Brazilian Nise da Silveira, the German Marie-Louise von Franz, and the Swiss-Jewish Aniela Jaffé. Furthermore, some historical contexts will be revealed in this narrative, mainly in the details of the introduction, seeking to familiarize the reader with the figure of Carl Jung. Finally, due to the previously indicated contradiction in the individual's psyche, the presence of complementary opposite phenomena will be observed within different characteristics of the concepts of conscious and unconscious, formulating what this research calls being and non-being simultaneously. These oppositions deal with the presence of two opposite and contradictory poles that do not annul each other, thus forming a psychic complement from opposites. In other words, a dialectic of the psyche is developed through human contradictions that trigger a transformation—a change of the subject itself in the process of becoming. Therefore, the two sides of the individual, conscious and unconscious, are equally important within their own proportions and must be preserved for collective and individual psychic health. Notes: O presente trabalho foi realizado com apoio da Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - Brasil (CAPES) - Código de Financiamento 001. Thu, 05 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48818 2026-02-05T00:00:00Z https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48702 Title: A noção Aristotélica de definição e seu papel no argumento elêntico Abstract: In Metaphysics IV.4, Aristotle sets out to “demonstrate by refutation” the Principle of Non- Contradiction (PNC). This argument, which is known as the elenctic argument, starts by demanding that an interlocutor who denies the PNC utters a meaningful name. Then, Aristotle reasons that this name must mean that it “is (or is not) this and that” and that this will be “something definite.” Consequently, the argument’s interlocutor could not, at the same time, affirm the negation of what has been defined. The central questions of this dissertation are: how should this argumentative step be interpreted and how does it relate to Aristotle’s notion of definition? On one hand, it can be read as involving a real definition, which is a statement of the essence of an existent being. On the other, it is interpreted as demanding a nominal definition, which is merely the explication of the meaning of a term. After exploring some of the different proposed interpretations, we will defend the latter alternative. In our first chapter, we will present the problem in question and some of the different ways in which it has been dealt with in the secondary literature. Following that, we’ll argue that a semantic interpretation of the argument, according to which its force lies only in aspects of the act of uttering a meaningful name, requires Aristotle to have a notion of nominal definition which he considers legitimate. In our second chapter, we’ll argue that this is the case by proposing what we’ll call an ampliative interpretation of Aristotelian definition. According to this interpretation, real and nominal definition occupy different regions of a continuum of definitional success, and are both considered, by Aristotle, to be legitimate and adequate for use in different epistemic contexts. In that chapter, we’ll examine the relevant textual evidence and deal with problems faced by this interpretation. Lastly, we’ll consider the consequences this ampliative interpretation of definition has for the semantic interpretation of the elenctic argument. Wed, 25 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48702 2026-02-25T00:00:00Z https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48582 Title: Velhice como fase da vida: contribuições da Psicologia do Desenvolvimento à constituição de uma Filosofia e Psicologia da Velhice e do Envelhecimento Abstract: This Thesis arises from an ethical and epistemological concern in the face of the contemporary scenario, marked by a ‘longevity revolution’ that, paradoxically, walks side by side with the emptying of meaning in the experience of aging. The central objective of this work is to defend the thesis that old age should not be understood as a residue of adult life or as mere biological decline, but as a legitimate phase of life, endowed with (i) specific psychic tasks, (ii) developmental potentialities, and (iii) its own ontological dignity. To support this proposition, my investigation articulates knowledge from Philosophy, Developmental Psychology (from the life-span perspective), Psychoanalysis (especially Winnicottian), and Historical-Cultural Psychology. In Chapter 1, I dedicate myself to a rigorous conceptual review, seeking to overcome a semantic confusion that, historically, contributed to the pathologization of the elderly. I oppose the reductionist biomedical model, relying, for this purpose, on the life-span perspective to define aging as a lifelong, multidimensional, and multidirectional process, which involves gains and losses, from birth to death. I establish the crucial distinction between aging, this biological-existential process; old age – understood here as a socially and culturally demarcated state –; and the constitution of the elder as the unique subject who inhabits this state. I turn to Simone de Beauvoir to denounce the ‘conspiracy of silence’, which transforms old age into a ‘shameful secret’, arguing that it is both a cultural and biological fact. This conceptual ‘ground clearing’ serves as a basis to affirm that development does not cease at maturity but rather acquires new configurations in the final stage of life. In Chapter 2, I enter the dimension of subjectivity, confronting classical Freudian pessimism regarding the analyzability of the elderly. If Sigmund Freud saw in ego rigidity and the accumulation of mnemonic material obstacles to treatment, I propose a paradigmatic shift towards the work of Donald Woods Winnicott, relying, for this, on the assistance of the Thesis already defended by Flavia Maria de Paula Soares. The central thesis of this chapter is that old age imposes on the subject a task of personal maturation of high complexity: the conquest of the ‘capacity to die’. I argue that health in old age does not lie in the manic maintenance of youthfulness, but in the self’s capacity to perform the movement of ‘integrating the ‘de-integration’’. Unlike pathological disintegration (the fear of breakdown), ‘de-integration’ is the mature acceptance of dependence and the dissolution of the boundaries of the Self, allowing a circular return to the initial state of non-integration, now lived with the wisdom of accumulated experience. For this to occur, however, the presence of a facilitating environment — a ‘clinic of holding’ — is indispensable, one that sustains the subject in the face of the anguish of annihilation and validates their existence until the end. In Chapter 3, I make a dialectical movement from the individual to culture, investigating the role of memory and narrative in the constitution of the elderly subject. Supported by Historical-Cultural Psychology (Vygotsky) and the Social Psychology of Memory (Ecléa Bosi, Halbwachs), I refute the view of memory as a mere neurophysiological archive subject to failure. I argue, with Ecléa Bosi, for the distinction between memory-dream (passive) and memory-work (active). I maintain that the act of remembering in old age is an arduous psychic work of reconstructing the past considering the present, a way of conferring meaning on existence fragmented by time. Autobiographical narrative emerges here not as nostalgia, but as a political act of resistance to ‘social death’ and the identity erasure imposed by consumer society. The elder, by narrating, fulfills the social function of guardian of collective memory and a link between generations, transforming their individual experience into human heritage. Finally, in Chapter 4, theory is confronted with praxis. I present reflections arising from a Professional Internship experience in Psychology within a Long-Term Care Facility for the Elderly (ILPI). In this chapter, I demonstrate how the abstract concepts of holding, perezhivanie (lived experience), and narrative become urgent clinical tools in the care of institutionalized elderly. The account evidences that, even in contexts of frailty and abandonment, the offer of qualified listening allows the subject to rescue their dignity and ‘stitch together’ the pieces of their history. Practice confirms the hypothesis that intervention in old age does not aim at the ‘cure’ of aging, but at sustaining a space in which the subject can continue until they cease to be. The Thesis concludes with the idea that the constitution of a Philosophy and Psychology of Old Age requires abandoning the lenses that see the elder only as a failing body. By integrating the procedural view of development (life-span), the clinical depth of the integration of finitude (Winnicott), and the political dimension of memory (Bosi), I propose an ethics of care that recognizes in the elder a subject of desire and history. Aging, far from being merely the shipwreck of the body, reveals itself as the final stage of a subjective construction, in which the supreme task is to confer meaning on the totality of a life lived, transforming biological destiny into a complete human biography. Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/48582 2026-03-20T00:00:00Z